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HUMAN RIGHTS IN ASIA: CHINA AND
THE BANGKOKDECLARATION*
Michael C. Davis**

I. INTRODUCTION

At present, Asia is caught in a veritable explosion of human
rights discussions. Asian governments are frequently confronted with
human rights challenges emanating from within their own
communities and from the outside. The responses from the
individual governments are as varied as any heard from governments
that have been vexed by similar challenges since the modem notion
of human rights was first conceived in enlightened thought. Human
rights violations in Asia run the whole gambit from harsh crackdowns
and political arrests to the diverse intimidations of soft
authoritarianism. At the same time, the regimes of the region
increasingly offer human rights justifications for their actions through
the media, and also, through more formal channels. Asian human
rights activists can currently be found on the streets, under house
arrest, in the jails and sometimes, already in power.
" This article expands upon this author's remarks published in 89 ASIL PROC.
146 (1995), © The American Society of International Law. For further
discussion of this issue, see essay, Chinese Perspectives on Human Rights, in
HUMAN RIGHTS AND CHINESE VALUES (Michael C. Davis, ed., 1995). Many

elements of the instant discussion are adopted from this essay.
" Senior Lecturer in Law, Chinese University of Hong Kong. J.D., Univerisity at
California (Hastings); L.L.M., Yale Law School. Professor Davis was the 1994-95
Schell Senior Fellow at the Schell Center for International Human Rights, Yale Law
School. He would like to acknowledge the Center for its contribution to this effort.
He would also like to thank Victoria Hui for reading and commenting upon the final
draft.
See generally Chalmers Johnson, Political Institutions and Economic
Performance:The Government-businessRelationship in Japan,South Korea and
Taiwan, in THE POLmCAL ECONOMY OF THE NEW ASIAN INDUSTRIALISM 136

(Frederic C. Deyo ed., 1987); TRANSITIONS FROM AUTHORITARIAN RULE
(Guillermo O'Donnell et al. eds., 1986).
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In March 1993, the Asian regional meeting in Bangkok was held
as a preliminary meeting to the Vienna World Conference on Human
Rights. Asian governments offered the Bangkok Declaration as a
challenge to the applicability of "universal standards" of human rights
in Asia.' China played a leading role in formulating this challenge.
Taking up a cultural relativist position, the Bangkok Declaration
argued for the importance of unique Asian factors -- historical,
cultural and economic -- in determining human rights standards. The
position also advocated that such standards were, generally, a
domestic matter. The private non-governmental organizations
(NGOs) that observed this regional meeting, however, opposed this
formulation and argued for the application of universal standards in
Asia.
The Bangkok Declaration represents the latest international
round in a long term, largely domestic, Asian struggle with the
modem concept of human rights. The Chinese experience with this
issue is particularly revealing, and is thus the focus of the current
assessment. Using a discursive approach, this essay challenges the
view that Asian governments can legitimately isolate themselves from
international human rights practices and values. In many respects, the
cultural relativist position presents a false dichotomy and does not
account sufficiently for current value discourse. Before addressing
the specifics of the Chinese discussion, the next section introduces a
discursive model.

2

THE BANGKOK DECLARATION,

DECLARATION OF THE MINISTERS

AND

REPRESENTATIVES OF ASIAN STATES, Bangkok, March 29 - April 2, 1993
(hereinafter BANGKOK DECLARATION).
3 OUR VOICE Bangkok NGO Declaration on Human Rights, Reports (Bangkok,

1993) of the Asia Pacific NGO Conference on Human Rights and NGOs'
Statements to the Asia Regional Meeting. This Bangkok NGO meeting included
representation from over 150 Asian NGOs, as well as other outside NGO groups.
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IT. HUMAN RIGHTS DISCOURSE

Within the parameters of a proper "theory" concerning
constitutional development, much can be understood about the
Chinese and Asian struggles with modern constitutional values and
human rights. Modem literature on constitutionalism suggests that
such a "theory" should be communications-based. Essentially, we
must ask who is saying what, with what purpose or values, through
what channels, with what effects.
The discourse about constitutionalism and human rights is
essentially a discourse about values. Its value-based character serves
to constrain and direct its evolution in many ways. The full scope of
such an evolution cannot be fully considered here.
The approach taken here assumes that human rights values are
developed in the context of institutions and processes, as well as the
dynamics between them. Values shape processes and institutions,
and give them meanings. While modern constitutionalism seeks to
integrate institutional and value discourses, it is important to note that
constitutional underdevelopment may produce considerable
disjuncture. This may cause political conflict, as well as a cycle of
activism and repression. As a constitutional system develops,
existing processes and institutions may define, if not confine, the
possibilities for the transformation of ideas and values.4 Freedom and
democracy, which are often among the aims of constitutionalism,
qualify as values and institutions, and also, as ideas and practices.
Many contemporary theories on constitutionalism and human
fights have emphasized the role of communications, institutional and
otherwise, in the evolution of human rights values. These include: (1)
the now classical theory of Alexander Bickel; (2) the so-called "New
Haven School" in international law theory; and even (3) modern

' See generally Peter A. Hall and Rosemary C. R. Taylor, PoliticalScience and
The FourNew Institutionalisms(Sept. 1994) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
the Center for European Studies, Harvard University.) Paper presented to the

Annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, New York, 1994.
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critical theory. 5 The first of these, Alexander Bickel's theory, focuses
on constitutional theory and the institutions of constitutional judicial
review in a fully developed system. The New Haven School focuses
on communications in the somewhat more primitive international
constitutive process. The modem critical theory focuses primarily on
the processes of value discourse on a conceptual and interpersonal
level.
In common law countries like Canada or the United States,
much of the human rights discourse may eventually find its way into
case law. In fact, Bickel's theory suggests that this is so. Likewise,
in the civil law world (or in hybrid legal cultures like the European
Union), the same point can be made about the accessibility of formal
constitutional or human rights discourse in judicial and administrative
decisions, even though the systems of legal/constitutional decisionmaking may be different. Beyond such official reflections, the
interpretations of academic discourse are reasonably accessible and
thorough. To a large extent, this accessibility reflects the conditions
of a developed constitutional democracy.
In an Asian country like China, however, constitutional or human
rights discourse may be more scattered and less formalized. This
discourse is also less accessible because of the severe political
constraints. In less developed systems, institutions may be at a
disjuncture with societies' value processes. Nevertheless, students of
constitutional and human rights development in Asia will find that
much is being said and done, both by officials and by their
opposition. Important statements may appear in international
declarations, such as the Bangkok Declaration, constitutions,
legislation and white papers, in peace charters, in the reports of

' See generally ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE
SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS, (2nd ed., 1986); The World Constitutive
ProcessofAuthoritativeDecision,in INTERNATIONAL LAW ESSAYS: A SUPPLEMENT
TO INTERNATIONAL LAW INCONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE (Myers S. McDougal and
W. Michael Reisman eds., 1981); ROBERTO M. UNGER, SOCIAL THEORY: ITS
SITUATION AND ITS TASK, A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION TO POLITICS, A WORK IN
CONSTRUCTIVE SOCIAL THEORY (1987).
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NGOs, in human rights manifestos, as well as in academic or legal
discussions. Though the shades of meaning of this vocabulary may
be colored by regional differences or the institutional perspective of
the speaker, much of the vocabulary of this discourse is similar.
A discursive analysis employs description, but not just the
description of static institutions. Rather, it is a description flowing
from the value producing process reflected in the dynamic interaction
between institutions and the society. As history seems to be repeating
itself in the Asian context (for example, the European enlightenment
shared similar concerns), this discourse will hopefully give a new
platform from which to view the difficult human rights issues in the
larger world.

III. HUMAN RIGHTS

IN CHINA

Discussion of human rights discourse in China begins in this
section with a discussion of the People's Republic of China (PRC)
Constitution and the formal legal requirements under Chinese law
(the system as it is). The next section of this article reflects on the
emerging human rights debate (the system as it may become).
Beginning with the formal legal structure, a student of human rights
is immediately struck by the disjunction between the rights promised
by the Chinese constitution and the actuality of the situation. Though
the PRC Constitution contains a rather long list of standard human
rights guarantees, the government and the party are little constrained.
Most human rights, therefore, are not enforced. A Chinese scholar
has characterized this practice as human rights nihilism,6 in that the
ideological beliefs (e.g. Marxist) challenge and largely vitiate the
human rights guarantees. This disjuncture reflects the pathology of
6 Du Gangiian and Song Gang, Relating Human Rights to Chinese Culture: The

FourPaths of the ConfucianAnalects and the FourPrinciplesof a New Theory of
Benevolence, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND CHINESE VALUES, LEGAL, PHILOSOPHICAL
AND POLITICALPERSPECriVES 35 (Michael C. Davis ed., 1995).
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an underdeveloped constitutional order. With institutional channels
largely closed off, there has been a radicalization of political dialogue
between those who promote human rights values and the rulers,
producing a cycle of activism and repression.
In effect, the usual constitutional channels are clogged. There is
an absence of a system for judicial review of legislation and/ or
administrative acts. Instead, under Articles 62 and 67 of the PRC
Constitution, the Constitution is interpreted directly by China's
legislative body, the National People's Congress, or its Standing
Committee. This interpretation is theoretically carried out through the
enactment of laws. While the government has, in recent years,
enacted various procedural laws to allow the people some form of
redress (in non-sensitive areas), the administrative and judicial
processes are yet unproved.
In a system where the government presumes that it represents the
collective will, democratic communication is also clogged. In the
absence of competitive democratic elections, the government
experiences little formal constitutional guidance or constraint. Only
recently, China instituted a system of allowing more candidates than
there are legislative seats. Though eight parties do exist and have
existed throughout communist rule, such parties are required to
submit to the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP),
which is constitutionally mandated.
This system permits little individual resistance or criticism. The
PRC Constitution mandates, in Article 51, that citizens' exercise "of
their freedoms and rights may not infringe upon the interests of the
state, of society and of the collective, or upon the lawful freedoms
and rights of other citizens." This provision allows the government
to resist the free speech claims raised by those who have been critical
of the government and those who are charged with crimes relating to
their political activity. Although there are some procedural laws
(noted above) which may offer some relief, this potential is still
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largely untested.7 In essence, the independence of the judiciary with
respect to the human rights violations is a major concern.8
Though freedom of speech, of the press and of assembly are
guaranteed in Article 35 of the constitution, the press also offers little
challenge to China's rulers. This is largely due to governmental or
collective ownership nationwide and to a rigorously enforced media
ethic which emphasizes the propaganda role of the press and strict
official secrecy. 9 When this iron control was broken by several

' China's law reform exercise has aimed at insuring the availability of adequate
legal process and at least the rudiments of the rule of law. In this context, a range
of process related laws have been passed in recent years. See generally, THE
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE LAW OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, July 1, 1979

(Rev. 1984); THE ADMINISTRATION LITIGATION LAW OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF
CHINA,

April 4, 1989; THE CIVIL PROCEDURE LAW OF THE PEOPLE'S

CHINA, SEPT. 4,

1991;

REPUBLIC OF
THE PROCURATOR GENERAL'S LAW OF THE PEOPLE'S

REPUBLIC OF CHINA, Feb.

:28, 1995;

THE ARBITRATION LAW OF THE PEOPLE'S

REPUBLIC OF CHINA, May 12, 1994. See also White Paperon CriminalReform, in
STATE COUNCIL INFORMATION SERVICE, Aug. 10, 1992 translated in FOREIGN
BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE DAILY REPORT SUPPLEMENT: CHINA, FBIS-

CHI-91-255-S, Nov. 21, 1992. At the same time, it has been reported that
prosecutors powers to fight corruption will be enlarged under a new draft law on
Penalties for Corruption and Bribery and the above Procurator General's Law. New
Laws to Target Corrupt Cadres, S. CHINA MORNING POST, INTERNATIONAL
WEEKLY, Dec. 3-4, 1994, at 1. The new Detailed Regulation on the Implementation
of State Security Law issued in July 1994, gives almost unfettered power to arrest
those alleged guilty of "hostile activities." Detailed Regulation on the
Implementation of State Security Law, DA GONG BAO, Jul. 30, 1994, at 4; Law
Sparks Fearsof Police State, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Jul. 14, 1994, at 10.
' The official legal newspaper, LEGAL DAILY, recently published an article entitled
"A Call for Judicial Independence." This article, surprisingly admits that China's
supposedly independent judiciary is far from free (of party interference). Callfor
Free Judiciary, S. CHINA MORNING POST, May 24, 1994, at 8. The editors
responsible for article have reportedly been reprimanded.
' CCP vigilance over newspapers usually produces sackings of offending editors.
IndependentMinded EditorSacked in Purge,S. CHINA MORNING POST, Apr. 30,
1994, at 7. This same scrutiny extends to film makers. Those who are
uncooperative, may be banned from making movies or have their films banned.
Blitz on the Film-makers, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Apr. 16, 1994, at 19.
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newspapers during the 1989 student demonstrations, which included
reporters from the People's Daily (China's leading newspaper)
marching in the square and publishing unauthorized reports, control
was restored almost immediately.
Professors Andrew Nathan and Randle Edwards have
emphasized several characteristics in China's human rights tradition:
(1) rights are not inherent in humanhood as under natural rights
doctrine but are created by the state; (2) rights provisions will
generally be worded in the positive, as an express agent; (3) greater
emphasis is placed on welfare rights while political rights are more
restricted; (4) rights are juxtaposed with duties, a sort of contigent
notion of rights; (5) instead of rights being a limit on the state, the
state's interests are often a limit on the rights; and (6) rights are
subject to restriction "according to law."' 10 A recent official white
paper on human rights seems to bare out this view."
To some extent, the Chinese government has begun to convey a
liberalizing message in its economic reform process, allowing for
some movement away from complete human rights nihilism. As is
generally true in the context of liberalizing authoritarian regimes, it
is expected that public pressure would fill any discursive space
created (especially with the above channels largely clogged). In this
context, the government can be expected to make moves to shape its
liberalizing message either through crackdowns (the historical
practice), or else by conveying some increased attention to human
rights (i.e. further liberalization and possibly democratization). While
efforts at the former are well known, some movement on the
liberalization front has also occurred.
On a formal level, while still not acceding to the two general
international human rights covenants, the government has declared its
adherence to the UniversalDeclarationof Human Rights. It has also
recently agreed to various specific international human rights treaties,
including the Convention Against Torture and the Convention to
10

R. RANDLE EDWARDS ET. AL., HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEMPORARY CHINA

121-22 (1986).
11 HUMAN RIGHTS IN CHINA (Beijing 1991).

43-47,
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EliminateDiscriminationAgainst Women. On the legislative front,
as noted above, it has enacted many laws on legal and administrative
procedure and the economy. Also, China has recently enacted the
Lawfor the Protectionof Women's Rights and Interest12 and a law to
protect prisoners' rights. As with the constitution, the problem of
enforcement is serious. It is important to note that when it comes to
the issues of livelihood, there has been increasing restiveness -especially from peasants and laborers.' 3 The government's reform in
domestic legislation is more likely to be a response to restiveness in
the evolving civil society, 4 rather than in response to dissidents. This
also produces some incentive to seriously implement law reform.
Most striking in regard to moving off of the nihilist position, are
the public pronouncements of the government in the face of the
public human rights challenge. In doing so, the government has
embraced the standards it often rejects on ideological grounds. China
has especially been called upon to explain itself to the Hong Kong
and foreign press (while persisting in acts of intimidation of the same
press through arrest and expulsion) and to foreign governments and
human rights NGOs (which often convey back messages originating
from dissidents in China). Thus while continuing to crack down hard
on dissidents, labor activists and journalists, the government has
demonstrated a tendency to justify its policies in human rights terms.
These justifications are seen in the form of frequent press briefings
and, on a more formal level, official human rights policy
pronouncements in the media, the various white papers on human
rights, and the Bangkok Declaration.

12 Ann

D. Jordan, Women's Rights in the People's Republic of China: Patriarchal

Wine Pouredfrom Socialist Bottles, 8 J. CHINESE L., 47 (1994).
"3Beijing in Fearof a Peasants'Revolt, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Mar. 9, 1994,

at 1.
14

Zhu Feng, Human Rights and the Political Development of Contemporary

China, 1979-1994, in

HUMAN RIGHTS AND CHINESE VALUES, LEGAL,
PHILOSOPHICAL AND POLITICAL PERSPECTIVES 116 (Michael C. Davis, ed., 1995).
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IV. INTELLECTUAL DISCOURSE CONCERNING
HUMAN RIGHTS VALUES

Many private voices in China challenge and supplement official
government pronouncements, producing evidence of incipient
evolution of human rights values. Earlier writings tended to be
critical of Western bourgeois notions of human rights and sought to
develop socialist theory. Serious attempts were made to understand
Marxist theory on human rights. The Chinese socialist critique of
human rights is significant in light of the fact that a traditional feudal
society, guided significantly by elitist Confucian principles, was
operative until very recently in China.
Recognizing that classical Confucianism has a strong humanistic
component, some recent scholarship has sought to also identify
human rights ingredients. 5 It is important to recognize that this is
taking place in a period of revival of Confucian values (especially
neo-Confucianism promoted by governments favoring soft
authoritarianism) that cuts across Asia; this represents a significant
backdrop to the cultural relativist strains in the Bangkok Declaration.
Such scholarship acknowledges the elitist nature of Confucianism,
but seeks to identify other humanist values compatible with modern
human rights values. This aims not to prove the establishment of
human rights in classical China, but simply to defeat arguments that
human rights are alien to Chinese soil.
Many dissident elements in the Chinese intellectual community
have severely challenged official attachment to the mandates of
political reality, tradition and Marxism. It is important to note that
many (so-called) dissidents in China are Marxist, yet many of other
intellectuals have embraced more clearly liberal notions of democracy
and human rights, and the application of universal standards. The
official shift off of the human rights nihilist position noted above has
been in no small part caused by the pressure from intellectuals in

"5 Du and Song, supra note 6.
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China. While the student-led democracy movement in Tiananmen
Square in 1989 is the most well known example, there have been
others, including the Democracy Wall movement in the late 1970s.
These movements, to the extent that they found a ready audience may
verify that some of the values -being expressed of justice, of public
accountability and of the right to openly express ideas have penetrated
beyond the elite to the masses, at least in the urban areas.
Less well known are the more subdued attempts by leading
intellectuals, both within and outside the government, to encourage
political reform. In the mid-1980s, scholars at People's University
conducted political surveys on the role of the media and encouraged
media reform. In the late 1980s, under the leadership of former CCP
General Secretary, Zhao Ziyang, government think-tanks (including
one led by the recently released dissident, Wang Juntao) encouraged
electoral and press reform. At the same time, more liberal factions
within the ruling elite in the government were promoting similar
political reform, though this effort appeared to fail in late 1986 and
early 1987, culminating in the deposing of CCP General Secretary Hu
Yaobang. In February 1989, forty intellectuals led by astrophysicist
Fang Lizhi wrote a letter demanding reform.
-More recently, in March 1994, seven intellectuals, led by Xu
Liangying, sent a similar letter to President Jiang Zemin demanding
that the government release "all citizens detained because of their
thoughts and expression of opinion. 16 The letter, entitled "An
Appeal for the Improvement of Human Rights in Our Country,"
asserted that "the right of the freedom of thought and the expression
of opinion is an inalienable right of modern man which brooks no
interference." A similar message was repeated in letters to the NPC

Alarm at Challenge to Leaders, S. CHINA MORNING POST, March 11, 1994, at
1. Detention of China's most famous dissident, Wei Jingsheng, who has recently
again been charged with a crime (this time attempting to overthrow the
government), has often been the target of such dissatisfaction protest of
intellectuals. Scholars urge Jiangto free dissident Wei, S. CHINA MORNING POST,
Dec. 1, 1995, at 10.
16
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during its session in February 1995." When China's leaders are
known to be concerned about popular unrest among workers, such
messages touch a sensitive cord.

V. DISCOURSE WITH THE OUTSIDE WORLD
The final weapon in China's formal arsenal is its conception of
sovereignty, which seriously resists outside interference. This was
recently emphasized in the official white paper On Human Rights in
China and in the Bangkok Declaration. In addition to sovereignty,
the white paper emphasized the importance of the right of subsistence
over other rights. Under this view a country must have sovereignty
to rule itself without outside interference and be able to secure the
subsistence needs of its people before it can aspire to other human
rights achievements.
The Chinese government effectively carried these and others
themes relating to economic development and culture into the
Bangkok Declaration. These themes, however, failed to get adopted
in Vienna. The Bangkok Declarationreflects Asia's official view on
human rights -- a view which was challenged by the Asian NGOs
attending the meetings in Bangkok and Vienna. At the Vienna
meeting, the Chinese Delegation Head, Liu Huaqiu, articulated
China's views as follows:
The concept of human rights is a product of historical
development. It is closely associated with specific
social, political and economic conditions and the
specific history, culture and values of a particular
country. Different historical development stages have
different human rights requirements .... Thus, one
17

Patrick E. Tyler, 12 Intellectuals Petition China on Corruption, N. Y.

TIMES,

Feb. 26, 1995, at Al. There have also been recent reports that liberal scholars have
set up on Hainan Island another reform minded think-tank called the China (Hainan)
Reform and Development Institute.
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should not and cannot think the human rights standard
and model of certain countries as the only proper ones
and demand all other countries to comply with them.
It is neither realistic nor workable to make
international economic assistance or even
international economic cooperation conditional on
them....
For the vast number of developing countries, to
respect and protect human rights is first and foremost
to ensure the full realization of the rights to
subsistence and development....
Nobody shall place his own rights and interests
above those of the state and society, nor should he be
allowed to impair those of others and the general
public. This is a universal principle of all civilized
societies....
To wantonly accuse another country of abuse of
human rights and impose the human rights criteria of
one's own country or region on other countries or
regions are tantamount to an infringement upon the
sovereignty of other countries and interference in the
latter's internal affairs, which could result in political
instability and social unrest in other countries....
State sovereignty is the basis for the realization of
citizens' human rights. If the sovereignty of a state is
not safeguarded, the human rights of its citizens are
out of the question, like a castle in the air. 8
Western governments, international and regional NGOs, and
numerous scholars have fostered a significant challenge to these
sovereignty arguments in China's human rights policy. China's
"s Speech by Liu Huaqiu, Head of the Chinese Delegation at the World Conference
on Human Rights in Vienna (June 15, 1993), in HUMAN RIGHTS AND CHINESE
VALUES: LEGAL, PHILOSOPHICALAND POLIICALPERSPECTIVES, supra note 6, at 13.
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argument was also ultimately rejected by the Vienna Declaration and
Programme of Action.' 9 The UN establishment of the office of the
UN High Commissioner for Human Rights some six months later (in
December 1993), confirmed this international resistance.
The challenge to China's theory of nearly absolute sovereignty
was begun in the early twentieth century when the international treaty
regime began to expand dramatically in a shrinking world. The realm
of exclusive state control retreated as the inclusive order expanded.
In this context, the distinction between interference and noninterference posed by China's claim should be recognized as a false
dichotomy. In a shrinking world, the more realistic question relates
to the extent of interference, rather than its occurrence. In the present
age, notions of popular sovereignty encourage the trend to expand the
regime of human rights and self-determination to better secure the
exercise of popular will from both internal and external displacement.
Asia is the only part of the world not united by a regional human
rights treaty, and is, thereby, the weakest link in the international
human rights regime. Recently, several East Asian countries -- like
Myanmar (Burma), Cambodia, Vietnam, Indonesia, North Korea and
China -- have all been widely criticized for their human rights
records.
In this context, the Bangkok Declarationmay represent a form
of progress. While the many Asian hard-line regimes and a few
Asian democracies joined hands in advancing an argument against
complete application of universal standards, they also acknowledged
wide scope for universal standards and the processes of human rights.
We should rightly fear that given the human rights records of several
of the governments involved, the cultural and developmental
exceptions are taken more seriously than the affirmations of universal
standards.
Another aspect of the external dimension includes the
effectiveness of pressure by Western developed countries. In recently

", United Nations World Conference on Human Rights: Vienna Declaration and
Programme of Action, adopted June 25, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1661 (1993).
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de-linking the allowance of Most Favored Nation (MFN) trading
status from China's human rights practices, the United States
administration has questioned the continued use of trade sanctions in
periods of more stable relations. There are indications that the United
States will target more trade specific issues in the future. At the same
time, the administration has tried (but failed) to set up a bi-lateral
Human Rights Commission. Attempts are still being made to
establish a U.S. monitoring body. Many countries, the U.S. included,
have also sent human rights delegations to China.
The more serious external pressure in the 1990s will probably
come from the international NGOs. NGOs have become increasingly
effective in drawing attention to human rights violations and
identifying prisoners of conscious. There appears to be a rectangular
relationship between dissidents, NGOs, foreign governments and
China, whereby the dissidents export their message through NGOs
who disseminate it and pressure Western governments, who in turn
pressure China. It is unlikely that the Chinese government would
listen to dissidents otherwise. NGOs are instrumental in causing the
demand for the governments to justify their policies. NGOs have
lobbied governments at almost every international meeting where
China's human rights record has been at issue. Likewise, Chinese
dissidents overseas have emphasized the importance of this effort.

VI. CONCLUSION

Human rights discussion in the modem age reveals a complex
dialogic process which is essentially about political values. In
constitutional development, this process takes on institutional
components. In political systems that are underdeveloped,
institutional resistance (or lack of formal channels) tends to displace
such value discourse, and instead, channel it into the more volatile
public arena -- often producing resistance from actors with a stake in
maintaining the existing system. China's current dialogic process
reveals symptoms of constitutional dysfunction; however, the cultural
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relativist arguments offered at this stage may reveal the seeds of
transformation. As Alexis de Toqueville discovered long ago in
America, it may be too late to turn back to the old order that no
longer exists.20
The dialogic process reflects a complex debate that defeats the
claim that human rights values are completely alien to Chinese
society. China has already conceded much more in its above
statements and the Bangkok Declarationthan it attacks. At the same
time, Chinese scholars, officials and society have already assimilated
far more of modem human rights values than either the government
or the drafters of the Bangkok Declarationwould care to admit, and
it remains to be seen if the disjuncture between practice and the
emerging transformative human rights values discussed in this essay
will ultimately be closed. 2

20 See generally ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA (1945).
2 Questions surrounding China's current political transition will certainly have

baring on this.
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